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Abstract— To date, most solutions proposed for secure routing in 
mobile, ad-hoc networks (MANETs) assume that secure 
associations between pairs of nodes can be established on-line; 
e.g., by a trusted third party, by distributed trust establishment. 
However, establishing such security associations, with or without 
trusted third parties, requires reliance on routing layer security. 
In this paper, we eliminate this apparent cyclic dependency 
between security services and secure routing in MANETs and 
show how to bootstrap security for the routing layer. We use the 
notion of statistically unique and cryptographically verifiable 
(SUCV) identifiers to implement a secure binding between IP 
addresses and keys that is independent of any trusted security 
service. We illustrate our solution with the Dynamic Source 
Routing (DSR) protocol and argue that the solution is applicable 
to other protocols such as SEAD and Ariadne. We evaluate the 
cost of the DSR solution with simulations over ns-2 and present 
some preliminary results.  
 
Index Terms—mobile ad-hoc networks, routing, security, DSR   
I. INTRODUCTION 
In contrast to the Internet where end users do not 
perform routing functions, mobile ad-hoc networks 
(MANETs) require end-user nodes to perform packet 
routing. In these networks, a pre-deployed, dedicated 
network fabric does not exist that routes packets and 
protects route integrity. Furthermore, MANET nodes are 
highly mobile and, consequently, the network topology 
changes frequently. Hence, every node must be able to 
maintain network connectivity, not just perform packet 
routing.  
Early protocols that performed routing in MANETs 
[2,7,13,14,15] assumed that all nodes were trusted; i.e., 
none of the nodes deliberately disrupted the routing 
protocol. More recently, several protocols were 
proposed to secure the routing layer from nodes that act 
maliciously and:  
• convince a node that it is on a route to the 
given destination when it is not.  
• lower the cost of a route thereby re-directing 
traffic to desired nodes; 
• fabricate route-maintenance messages for  
selected routes or links. 
These protocols integrate security features within 
traditional routing protocols, such as DSR [7], 
AODV[16], DSDV[15], and aim to protect against 
message modification, fabrication or address spoofing 
through cryptographic means [3,5,13].  However, all 
these protocols assume that secure associations between 
the nodes of the network exist or can be established on-
line.1 Typically, these associations consist of either 
symmetric keys shared between any two nodes 
distributed with the help of a trusted key distribution 
center (KDC), or public-key certificates associated with 
individual nodes and signed by a trusted certification 
authority (CA). More recently, a distributed service for 
establishing trust relations among network nodes from 
PGP certificates has been proposed that does not rely on 
a trusted authority infrastructure [6]. Security 
associations and trust relations among nodes form the 
basis for building the security features of the routing 
layer; e.g., message authentication, replay detection.  
The assumption of pre-established secure associations 
may be practical in environments where such 
associations can be established off-line [17]. However, 
this assumption is less suitable for secure routing in 
large MANETs where secure associations have to be 
setup on-demand and on-line. In this case, a cyclic 
dependency arises between security services (e.g., 
certificate distribution, shared key generation, 
distributed trust establishment) and routing services 
since security services require routing layer security 
themselves (viz., Section II). To break this dependency, 
security associations must be bootstrapped into the 
routing layer without reliance on any security services. 
In this paper, we show how to bootstrap secure 
associations for the routing protocols of MANETs on-
line, without assuming any trusted authorities or 
distributed trust-establishment services. We rely on the 
use of statistically unique and cryptographically 
 
1 Other protocols rely on intrusion-detection mechanisms to discover and 
isolate malicious nodes [8], and tacitly assume that the intrusion-detection 
sensors running in network nodes are somehow protected from the nodes in 
which they are installed. In the end, these protocols still need to assume the 
presence of security associations to remove some of the less realistic trust 
assumptions made. 
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verifiable (SUCV) identifiers [10] and public-secret key 
pairs generated by the nodes themselves, in much the 
same way SUCVs are used in MobileIPv6 (MIPv6) to 
solve the address “ownership” problem [10,12] and to 
counter the “bidding down” attack [11] in return 
routability. We present the bootstrapping solution in the 
context of the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol 
and argue that the solution is applicable to other secure 
routing protocols, such as SEAD [3] and Ariadne [5]. 
We evaluate the performance of our solution using a ns-
2 simulation, and present the preliminary results. 
II. BOOTSTRAPPING SECURE ASSOCIATIONS 
A. A Cyclic Dependency Problem 
Routing and security are separate services in any 
network. The routing service depends on security 
services to authenticate the source of a message (i.e., its 
IP address) and the message content. For example, 
routing needs to determine that the source address of a 
route-request, route-reply, or control message was not 
spoofed, and that the message was not modified by 
malicious nodes while in transit between a source and a 
destination. The dependency between secure routing and 
security services is identified by arrow (1) in Figure 1. 
Message authentication is typically implemented using 
either shared symmetric keys or public-private key pairs 
and requires that the shared or public keys are associated 
(bound) in a secure way with the nodes’ (IP) addresses,  
on-line.  
To obtain secure bindings between a node’s IP address 
and key, a node must either reach a trusted-authority 
node or must establish trust relationships with other 
nodes without relying on trusted authorities [6]. Even if 
we assume that the IP address of all nodes are known a 
priori, there is still the need to establish a route from 
any node to a trusted-authority node or to a peer node 
that does not include malicious nodes. If malicious 
nodes are present on any of these routes, they may 
launch denial-of-service attacks and, worse yet, 
impersonate trusted servers or peer nodes. Secure 
routing seeks to counter these attacks, typically by 
detecting the effects of malicious node actions on a 
route, and by finding alternate routes. Hence, both 
trusted authorities and distributed trust establishment 
without trusted authorities depend on secure routing 
services. This dependency is identified by arrow (2) of 
Figure 1. 
In summary, a cyclic dependency arises between 
security and secure-routing services, which we seek to 
remove for any secure implementation of routing 
services.  
B. Breaking the Cyclic Dependency 
To break the dependency cycle illustrated in Figure 1, 
we have to remove dependency (1). Removing 
dependency (2) would be impractical because it would 
require that the nodes implementing security services be 
reachable by all other nodes in the network by a fixed 
set of routes; to implement any routing function for 
these nodes would defeat the purpose. We remove 
dependency (1) by using a secure binding mechanism 
for establishing secure node-to-node associations that is 
independent of both secure routing and other security 
services (viz., Figure 2). This mechanism forms the 
building block for bootstrapping security associations 
for secure routing protocols. 
The idea of a secure binding between an IP address 
and a key that is independent of any other security 
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Figure 1. Dependency cycle between secure 
routing and security services. 
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    routing and security services. 
 (1’) 
 (2)  (2’) 
 3
services is due to O’Shea and Roe [12] and Montenegro 
and Castelluccia [10]. They used it in the context of 
securing the control messages of MIPv6. We briefly 
review the idea of secure  <IP address, public key> 
binding for the sake of completeness and ignore its 
MIPv6 application specifics. 
To generate an IP address that is securely bound to a 
public key, a node generates a 64-bit pseudo-random 
value by applying a one-way, collision-resistant hash 
function to the public key of its (uncertified) public-
private key pair. Then, the IP address is generated as the 
concatenation of a network specific identifier (64 bits in 
MIP6) and the hash of the public key (64 bits). The 
binding between this IP address and the public key is 
secure because it is computationally unfeasible for an 
attacker (1) to create another <public, private> key pair 
whose hash generates the same IP address (because of 
the second pre-image resistance of one-way, collision-
resistant hash functions), and (2) to discover the secret 
key, or create a different one, for a given public key (by 
definition). Due to the size of the resulting address 
space, this IP address is also statistically unique. 
A source node uses the secure binding to authenticate 
its IP address and the contents of its packets to an 
arbitrary destination node as follows. The node signs a 
packet with its private key and sends the signed packet 
to the destination address together with its public key 
(and IP address). The destination node verifies that the 
IP address is securely bound to the public key by 
computing the hash function of the received public key 
and comparing the result with the lower 64-bit field of 
the IP address. (Thus, the IP address “certifies” the 
validity of the public key thereby preventing an attacker 
from spoofing the source address.) Then, the destination 
node authenticates the content of the packet by verifying 
the signature with the public key.  
This authentication scheme is implemented without 
using any security services. As illustrated in Figure 2, 
dependency (1) is removed and replaced with 
dependency (1’), which does not lead to a cyclic 
dependency. Also, dependency (2’) is added to indicate 
that higher-level security mechanisms, such as those of 
MIPv6, need to enhance the basic secure binding 
mechanism (e.g., to allow IP address changes) for 
different applications. Note that routing-layer 
authentication is also used to implement simple replay-
detection mechanisms for routes (viz., Section III 
below). Finally, we note that bootstrapping of 
additional, different security associations for the routing 
layer becomes unnecessary. 
III. SECURING DSR 
A. Basic scheme 
In this paper, we do not aim to provide a complete 
description of DSR security and, instead focus only on 
providing end-to-end security for the basic DSR [7] 
features without optimizations as the optimizations in 
DSR make the protocol vulnerable to attacks [13]. Our 
approach is similar to the one of Papadimitratos and 
Haas [13], except that we bootstrap the secure 
association in the protocol itself, by using secure <IP 
address, public key> bindings. We illustrate the basic 
protocol using an example topology shown in Figure 3. 
DSR is composed of two basic services, namely route 
discovery and route maintenance. In route discovery any 
source node S wishing to send a packet to any 
destination node D, to which it has no cached route, 
discovers a route to D. In route maintenance, source S 
detects if the route it is using to D is still valid in the 
face of topology changes, and, if the route is no longer 
valid, it discovers a new one. 
 Route Discovery. When a source node S wants to 
discover a route to destination D, it initiates route 
discovery. It constructs a Route Request message 
including the source (S) and destination (D) identifiers, 
a unique request sequence number, and an (initially 
empty) list to accumulate the addresses of intermediate 
nodes forwarding the request to D. Source S digitally 
signs the source and destination identifiers and the 
sequence number. It appends the signature and its public 
key (1024 bits) to the packet and broadcasts it. Each 
intermediate node receiving the packet appends its 
address to the node list and rebroadcasts the packet. If 
an intermediate node finds that its address is already on 
the node list, it discards the packet. 











Figure 3. Example topology. S is trying to 
communicate with D. M is a malicious node. 
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D authenticates the Route Request packet. First, D 
verifies the validity of the public key by hashing the 
public key and comparing the result to the lower half of 
the source S’s IP address in the packet. Then, if the 
comparison indicates a match, D verifies the signature 
on the packet. If the signature is valid, then D checks to 
see if the sequence number in Route Request is greater 
than the last sequence number it has seen from S, if true 
D constructs a Route Reply packet. It extracts the 
accumulated path in the Route Request, includes a copy 
of it in the Route Reply packet, and digitally signs the 
destination and source addresses, the sequence number, 
and the accumulated path. It then appends its public key 
and the signature to the packet, and source routes the 
packet on the reverse of this accumulated path.  
When source node S receives the Route Reply packet, 
it first authenticates the (source and content of the) 
packet and verifies the reply’s validity. To authenticate 
the packet, S verifies the public key of destination node 
D by hashing it and comparing it against the lower half 
of the address of D. If the comparison yields a match, 
then S verifies the D’s signature on the packet. If the 
signature verification passes, D proceeds to verify the 
validity of the reply. First, S checks if it has a pending 
Route Request to node D with the sequence number 
returned by the Route Reply packet. If it has one, then S 
extracts the node list out of the packet and compares it 
against the reverse of source route in the packet header. 
If this comparison yields a match, the reply is valid and 
S caches this route. If any of the above checks fail, S 
discards the reply packet. Figure 4 shows the flow of 
messages for route discovery.  
Route Maintenance. When sending a packet on an 
established route, source S includes the complete 
sequence of nodes through which the packet should 
travel. Each node along the path forwards the packet to 
the next node indicated in the path. If any node fails to 
forward it due to link failure or any other reason 
(detected by the link layer, in our case 802.11 MAC 
protocol), it signs the packet, appends its public-key, it 
source routes a Route Error to the original source of the 
packet (S) on the reverse of the source route contained 
in the data packet, thereby identifying the broken link 
from itself to the next node.  
When source S receives a Route Error packet, it first 
authenticates it by checking the whether the hash of the 
public key matches the lower half of the IP node that 
signaled the error, and whether the signature is valid. 
Then S checks the validity of the Route Error packet. S 
checks whether the address of the node that signaled the 
error is at the head of broken link in the route. If any of 
the checks fail, S discards the error packet. Then, S 
removes the broken link from its route cache. For 
subsequent packets or the retransmission of this packet, 
source S may use any other route to that destination 
available in its cache or may initiate new route 
discovery.  
State maintenance. Note that intermediate nodes do 
not maintain state in our approach. That is, nodes store 
neither the <sequence number, source S> pair as in DSR 
S→ ∗   (Rq,S,D,#,(empty list)) {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
   
1→ ∗   (Rq,S,D,#,(1))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
   
2→ ∗    (Rq,S,D,#,(1,2))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
   
3→ ∗   (Rq,S,D,#,(1,2,3))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
   
D→ 3  (Rp,SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  { SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3)}SK-D  (PK-D) 
   
3→ 2  (Rp,SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  {SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3)}SK-D  (PK-D) 
   
2→1   (Rp,SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  { SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3)}SK-D  (PK-D) 
   
1→ S  (Rp,SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  { SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3)}SK-D  (PK-D) 
 
Figure 4.  Message flow for the discovery of route {1,2,3} between source S and destination D of Figure 1. 
Legend:  ∗  indicates broadcast address. Rq and Rp are request and reply tags. SR(x,y,z) indicates source route x 
to y to z. SK-X and PK-X indicate secret key and public key of X respectively. {abc}SK-X  indicates signature of 
X on abc. # indicates sequence number. 
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nor <random identifier, source S, destination D> triple 
as in SRP. Storing sequence number has the 
disadvantage that a malicious node can fabricate Route 
Requests with high sequence numbers and cause denial 
of service for future legitimate requests that now appear 
to be duplicate packets from that particular source. 
Although SRP prevents this false-replay attack by using 
a new random identifier for a source-destination pair 
instead of the sequence number, it cannot detect real-
replay attacks since a malicious node can modify the 
random identifier and replay the packet as new one. 
Instead of maintaining state in intermediate route nodes, 
we maintain state only in end nodes; i.e., to detect replay 
of Route Request and Route Reply packets. 
B. Symmetric-key version of our protocol 
Given the limited computational and power constraints 
of some mobile devices, the use of public-key 
cryptography may impact the performance of the 
protocol both in computation and byte overhead to 
transport the public key. To limit this impact, we make 
minor modifications to the protocol aimed at minimizing 
the use of public-key cryptography.  
We use public-key cryptography only when initiating a 
route discovery to a particular destination and only for 
the first time. During this interaction with the 
destination node, we exchange a symmetric key and use 
this symmetric key to maintain a route to this destination 
(i.e. for subsequent route discoveries caused by topology 
changes). Note that the destination node generates the 
symmetric key, encrypts it and binds the encryption 
cryptographically to its reply packet. The validity check 
performed by source S also ensures that the symmetric 
key is fresh; i.e., it is not an old key generated by D for 
this route. Figure 5 shows the flow of messages during 
route discovery using the modified protocol. Similarly, 
for route errors, if the node generating the route errors 
shares a symmetric-key with the source of the data 
packet it will use it to integrity protect the packet else it 
will use the its secret key. Therefore, we do not 
compromise the security of the secret-key associated 
with our SUCV identifier and also we can change the 
symmetric-key shared with a node, as often as needed. 
C. Application to Other Protocols 
Our solution for bootstrapping security associations 
between nodes for DSR can be used in conjunction with 
other secure routing protocols like SEAD [3] and 
Ariadne [5]. For example, SEAD assumes a shared key 
between all the nodes in the network to authenticate the 
source address of the updates sent by neighbors. Using 
the secure <IP address, public key> binding allows 
performing the same task without a pre-established 
shared key. Moreover, the last element of the one-way 
hash chain can be broadcast, and signed with the secret 
key associated with the public key of the secure <IP 
address, public key> binding. Similarly, Ariadne 
assumes that there exists a shared key between 
communicating nodes and that every node knows an 
element of the TESLA one-way key chain of every other 
S→ ∗   (Rq,S,D,#,(empty list)) {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
      
1→ ∗   (Rq,S,D,#,(1))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
      
2→ ∗    (Rq,S,D,#,(1,2))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
       
3→ ∗    (Rq,S,D,#,(1,2,3))  {S,D,#}SK-S  (PK-S) 
 
D→ 3  (Rp, SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  (KSD)PK-S { SR(3,2,1),S,D,# ,(1,2,3),KSD}SK-D   (PK-D) 
     
3→ 2  (Rp, SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  (KSD)PK-S { SR(3,2,1),S,D,# ,(1,2,3),KSD}SK-D     (PK-D) 
 
2→1   (Rp, SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  (KSD)PK-S { SR(3,2,1),S,D,# ,(1,2,3),KSD}SK-D      (PK-D) 
 
1→ S  (Rp, SR(3,2,1),S,D,#,(1,2,3))  (KSD)PK-S { SR(3,2,1),S,D,# ,(1,2,3),KSD}SK-DS    (PK-D) 
 
Figure 5.  Message flow in the discovery of route {1,2,3} between source S and destination D with key exchange. 
Legend: ∗  indicates broadcast address. SR(x,y,z) indicates source route x to y, y to z. SK-X and PK-X indicate 
secret key and public key of X respectively. {abc}SK-X  indicates signature of X on abc. (abc)PK-X  indicates 
encryption with public key of X. # indicates sequence number. Rq and Rp are request and reply tags.  
KSD indicates secret key between S and D. 
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node. Using secure <IP address, public key> binding, 
communicating nodes can exchange a symmetric-key, 
and all nodes can broadcast the element of their TESLA 
one-way key chain signed with their secret key 
associated with the public key of the secure <IP address, 
public key> binding, without requiring any a priori 
secure association. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. Security of  <IP address, public key> binding 
        The security of the <IP address, public key> 
binding relies on the security of the public-key 
cryptosystem and on the second pre-image resistance 
property of the hash function. Both these assumptions 
are practical. For example, RSA public key 
cryptosystems would satisfy our security requirements 
(viz., Section II). Further, for a hash function that has an 
output of 64 bits and is second pre-image resistant (as 
both MD5 and SHA-1 are conjectured to be), an 
adversary must use 262 attempts, on the average, to find a 
second public key that yields a given IP address (if we 
assume that one of the 64 bits is reserved, as in MIPv6). 
This work factor is clearly prohibitive for any practical 
adversary and any fast, second pre-image resistant hash 
function even if we ignore the fact that the adversary’s 
attempts must be public keys and not arbitrary guesses 
of hash function inputs. Furthermore, although birthday 
attacks against the hash function may produce collisions 
between hash function inputs drawn from a uniform 
distribution after only 232 attempts, such attacks are 
impractical in this setting. The number of nodes 
necessary to enable a collision between two arbitrary 
nodes would have to be of the order of 109 nodes, which 
is clearly impractical. 
B. Security Analysis of the protocol 
         We consider several possible attacks mounted by 
non-colluding adversaries2 on our protocol using the 
example topology of Figure 1. For simplicity we do not 
show the signatures and keys in the messages.  
 
Attack 1: Assume that node 1 receives a route request 
from source node S. Node 1 may try to send a reply to S 
giving a false route. However, since node S expects a 
reply from destination node D, S will discard replies 
from any other node. Node 1 may try to pretend to be 
node D but the reply will not pass S’s authentication 
check. Of course, node 1 can always drop the route 
 
2 Like most other secure routing protocols[5,12], ours is not designed to 
handle attacks by multiple nodes acting in collusion, as would be necessary 
for the wormhole attack 
request but that will be a problem when there is a single 
route from S to D and node 1 is on it. 
 
 Attack 2: Malicious nodes may try either to shorten or 
to lengthen a route by modifying the node list on a Route 
Request. For example, node 1 might not append its 
address to the list of a Route Request. Let us assume that 
nodes 2 and 3 follow the protocol correctly so that D 
receives the packet (Rq,S,D,#,(2,3)). D will construct a 
route reply and source route it over the reverse of the 
node list and when the route reply reaches node 2, it 
cannot send it to S as S is not its neighbor; so the reply 
will not reach S. Also, a malicious node might be able to 
lengthen a route by appending false IP addresses to a 
Route Request but it wouldn’t gain anything other than 
the route being avoided, which it can achieve anyway by 
not forwarding the Route Request in the first place. 
 
Attack 3: Intermediate nodes, such as node 2, might 
modify a Route Reply (e.g., it might add to or delete 
from the nodes of the node list), but S would not accept 
the modified Route Reply as a signature or the message 
authentication code of D would not pass S’s 
authentication check.  
 
Attack 4: An attacker might want to mount a replay 
attack. Replayed requests will be detected at D and 
replayed replies will be detected at S by using standard 
mechanisms based on sequence numbers.  
 
Attack 5: An attacker can flood a node with route 
requests and exhaust its resources as the node has to 
authenticate packet signatures, and signature 
authentication is a computationally intensive operation. 
Alternatively, he can generate fake route errors to make 
a node verify the signatures. Most of these attacks are 
thwarted by the IP address check. To counter the rest of 
them, the protocol can be implemented in such a way 
that signature verification is the last check done. If any 
of the validity checks performed before signature 
authentication fail, the verifier can drop the packet.  
V. COST ANALYSIS 
We performed a set of preliminary experiments using 
the popular ns-2 simulator with the CMU Monarch 
extensions for mobility to evaluate the overhead of our 
security mechanism. We used a random way point 
model for our mobility scenarios in the setting described 
in Table 1. We compare our protocol (SDSR) to DSR 
and an implementation of DSR without optimizations 
(DSR-NO-OPT). 
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A. Packet Overhead 
SDSR does not support the DSR optimizations [7] since 
it performs end-to-end signature authentication of 
control messages and verification of whether a node is 
authorized to send a control message. Therefore, an 
intermediate node cannot reply from its cache or send a 
route maintenance message concerning a link that it is 
not an end-point of, since it cannot be verified whether 
that node had the right to send that message; i.e., the 
node could be malicious. In terms of packet overhead, 
there is no difference between SDSR and DSR-NO-
OPT, since SDSR does not require any additional 
message exchanges. Figure 6 illustrates the packet 
overhead of DSR versus DSR-NO-OPT/SDSR. 
B. Byte overhead 
SDSR exchanges the same number of messages as DSR-
NO-OPT. However, these messages also contain 
signatures and public-keys. Every control message is 
signed (16 bytes) and contains the public-key of the 
signer (128 bytes) since it is not known whether the 
recipient already has a copy of the public key. 
Alternatively, if the symmetric key version of SDSR is 
used and HMAC-MD5 is the message authentication 
code, then only an extra 16 byte field is used. 
Figure 7 shows the byte overhead of DSR, DSR-NO-
OPT, SDSR using only public keys, and SDSR using 
symmetric keys. This figure illustrates the significant 
overhead decrease in overhead when using the 
symmetric key version of SDSR instead of the public-
key-only version.   
C. Average delay 
A lower bound. If the cost of security (hash, signatures 
generation and verification) were zero, our protocol 
would perform exactly as DSR-NO-OPT. This gives us a 
lower bound on the average delay of our protocol. By 
delay we mean the time between a packet is sent from 
the application layer at one node and received at the 
application layer of the destination node. This delay 
takes into account the route discovery and the 
transmission time. (We are still in the process 
incorporating the computation delay of the hash function 
and signature computation/verification into our ns 
simulations.) Figure 8 illustrates the average delay 
versus mobility. Note that, for high mobility, the non-
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Figure 8. Average delay with respect to mobility 
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is caused by the high number of stale routes provided by 
the reply from cache in the optimized DSR [4]. 
However, for low mobility, DSR-NO-OPT has an 
average delay double that of DSR. 
Computation-cost estimates. Prior work focused on the 
time and power consumption involved in signing and 
verifying a message using various algorithms [1,9]. For 
example, Modadugu et al. [9] show that on a 14Mhz 
Palm V the time to perform RSA operations is: 
• 15 minutes, for 1024 bits RSA key generation; 
• 27.8 seconds, for 1024 bits RSA signature  
generation, and 
• 0.758 seconds, for 1024 bits RSA signature 
verification (e=3). 
However, the PalmPilot was not designed with security 
in mind, and hardware crypto accelerators of the size of 
a dime, like the iButton [18], can now perform RSA 
operations in less than a second. (The cost of such a unit 
is about $15. Also, public-key generation can be done 
off-line.) Nevertheless, the computational cost can be 
decreased substantially by using symmetric keys since a 
message authentication code function such as the 
HMAC is very cheap to compute even on the Palm V.  
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we proposed a scheme to bootstrap 
security within DSR thereby eliminating the need to 
assume pre-established secure associations among the 
nodes of the network. We achieved this through the use 
of a secure <IP address, public-key> binding. Our 
scheme is secure against multiple uncoordinated 
attackers. In future work we plan to evaluate our 
bootstrapping approach with other secure routing 
protocols in the presence of malicious nodes. 
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